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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
FORCIBLE EXTRACTION OF BODY FLUIDS BY
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
M ODERN crime detection techniques made possible by recent tech-
nological advances have, in many instances, become standard pro-
cedure with law enforcement agencies.' While many of these methods
are, as yet, of dubious scientific accuracy,2 the reliability of body fluid
analyses has been established beyond cavil,3 and, on a technical level, no
objection can effectively be interposed to their employment for evidenti-
ary purposes. Where the body fluids have been forcibly extracted, how-
ever, there arise three possible constitutional objections: 4 First, it may be
' The more important cases are collected in Note, Admissibility of Evidence Ob-
tained by Scientific Devices and Analyses, 5 U. FLA. L. Rav. 5 (19525. The use of
photographs, motion pictures, ballistics tests, wire and tape recorders, X-rays, type-
writing and handwriting analyses, wire-tapping, and fingerprinting is too well established
to merit extensive discussion herein, however.
'The history of the development of truth serums dates back to 192z when
scopolamine was first used in this connection. The principal objection to the use of
such drugs for the purpose of securing a confession is the strong possibility that it may
be false. "It is subject to being mingled with fancy. It is subject to being molded by
the suggestions of the interrogator. In the hands of incompetent or unethical inter-
rogators, a suspect can make a wide variety of unreliable statements." Despres, Legal
Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHI. L. RaV. 6ox, 6o6 (947).
The hypnotic trance can produce similar difficulties. Illusions and hallucinations are
always possible, and the hypnotist can manipulate his subject almost at will. See Note,
s U. FLA. L. RFV. 5, io (z952) and cases therein cited.
Results obtained from lie-detector and drunkometer tests have likewise been held
inadmissible, the former not having been technically perfected to a sufficient degree of
accuracy, INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION, 66-68 (595o), and the latter because the
accuracy of its results is directly dependent upon the skill of its operator. Harger,
"Debunking" the Drunkometer, 40 J. CraM. L., C. & P.S. 497 (-949).
' Blood and urine tests are generally accepted today for their accuracy. Despres,
Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 6oi, 609 (1947).
See INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION 72-82 (595o) for the cases in which the results
of such tests have been admitted. As a general standard, it is agreed that the presence
in the blood of zSo milligraps of alcohol per xoo cubic centimeters of blood will create
a presumption of intoxication. Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests
to Determine Intoxication, 29 VA. L. REV. 749, 752 (19€3) 5 Muelberger, Medico-legal
Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication, 39 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 411, 412
(1948).
'These objections can be raised only if the extraction is achieved by force or com-
pulsion, for, if the accused submits voluntarily, the doctrine of waiver will preclude
the raising of any constitutional objection to the use of such evidence, unless the subject
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asserted that the accused's privilege against self-incrimination has been
violated; second, that the conduct of police officers constituted an un-
reasonable search and seizure i and third, that conduct of police officers
constituted acts of a character so violent or brutal as to amount to a
denial of due process of law.' How valid are they?
DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The privilege against self-incrimination was narrowly defined in
Holt v. United States,' where Mr. Justice Holmes announced for the
Court that 7
... the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material....
As authoritatively restated by Professor Wigmore, the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was limited to
testimonial evidence." Thus, it would seem that the accused who con-
matter is jurisdictional. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 667 (Sth ed. 1927).
With regard to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in particular,
the Supreme Court has held that a witness must expressly assert and claim his consti-
tutional immunity, or he will be deemed to have waived it. Rogers v. United States,
340 U.s. 367, 370 (i95 ); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (943).
See generally, Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Ciminal Cases, 69 HARv. L.
REy. 683 (1956).
'These three constitutional objects are not the only ones which have been raised.
For example, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) rested its decision on what it considered to be an invasion of the person.
State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953). That this interpretation of the
Rochin decision, however, is without foundation is pointed out in Note, 41 CALIF. L.
REV. 7z8 (x953).
0218 U.S. 245 (1910).
218 U.S. 245, 252-z53 (1g9o). The Holt case marks the initial adoption by the
Supreme Court of the view that the fifth amendment privilege extends only to testi-
monial evidence. In that case, defendant was charged with murdering another by
bludgeoning him with an iron bar, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
One of the errors alleged on appeal was that the accused had been compelled to try
on a blouse which the authorities claimed belonged to him. A witness, called by the
prosecution, testified that he had seen the accused put on the blouse and that it fitted
him. The Court held that the defendant had not been compelled to testify against
himself by trying on the blouse, thus establishing the limits of the privilege.
8 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265 (3d ed. 1940) and cases cited therein. It has been
held specifically that a urine specimen does not fall within the scope of the privilege.
United States v. Nesmith, 'zi F. Supp. 758, 762 (D.D.C. 1954). Many jurisdictions,
however, do not draw any distinction between testimonial evidence and real evidence
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tends that the admission into evidence of body fluids forcibly extracted
from him violates his privilege against self-incrimination will be flaying
a very dead horse..
In United States v. Willis,10 a federal district court held that forcible
evacuation of the stomach contents of the accused violated the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and
that evidence obtained thereby might not be admitted." This protection,
for the purpose of defining the scope of the privilege created by the particular state
constitutional or statutory provision.
The line between testimonial and real evidence is not the only distinction which has
been drawn although this is generally regarded as the orthdox approach. It has been
suggested that the privilege extend to any evidence secured by compulsion. Some
attempts have even been made to differentiate between "forced passivity" and "forced
activity," but the application of these so-called tests in actual cases reveals that they
are, at best, only labels. See Note, 44 Ky. L.J. 353 (x9s6). See generally, Comment,
To What Extent Does the Privilege A4gainst Self-Incrimination Protect an 4ccused from
Physical Disclosures, i VAND. L. REv. 24.3 (1948). Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
'There has becn, however, a vigorous attack on the statement of Holmes in the
Holt case, despite its apparent widespread acceptance as the general rule in this area.
Justices Black and Douglas would extend the privilege of the accused so as to encompass
"words taken from his lips, capsules taken from his stomach, blood taken from his
veins. . . ." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. I65, 179 (.952) (concurring opinion).
See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 443 (957) (dissenting opinion).
This thesis, however, runs afoul of the decisions of the Court in Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (i908) and, subsequently, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947) to the effect that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does
not incorporate, as a limitation on state governments, the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment.
10 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. .949).
" The Court first held that probable cause existed for the arrest of the defendant
and that the search, incidental to the arrest, which revealed certain money and a match
folder "was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 85 F. Supp.
745, 747 (S.D. Cal. 1949). This holding is in accord with a line of Supreme Court
decisions permitting searches and seizures when incidental to arrest. See Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 2o
(1925) ; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Cf. Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
The district court in the Willis case then went on to hold that the evidence obtained
by means of the stomach pump was the fruit of an unreasonable search within the pur-
view of the fourth amendment. 85 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S.D. Cal. x949). This con-
clusion was reached only after extensive analysis of Harris v. United States, sup ra. The
court also relied extensively on the case of In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex.
1949), since that case similarly involved the use of a stomach pump to obtain morphine
which the accused had swallowed. The court in that case rested its decision on un-
reasonable search and seizure grounds, pointing to the words of the fourth amendment
which insures to the people the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects. The court said, "if the stomach pump can be justified, then the opening of
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however, has been limited to defendants in federal courts, since the
United States Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado,12 while ruling that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to
the states, 8 concluded that the federal exclusionary rule did not pro-
hibit the use of such evidence in state courts. 4 Hence, in the absence
of a state exclusionary rule,'5 an objection to the forcible extraction of
body fluids on the ground that it constitutes an unreasonable search and
seizure will avail the defendant but little.
The Supreme Court revitalized this "virtually meaningless pro-
tection from unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers" in
one's person by the surgeon's knife can be justified. We should then have returned to
trial by ordeal which has long since been abolished by right-thinking, liberty-loving
people." (The logical connection between surgical operation and trial by ordeal is not
Clear.)
The temper of the opinions in the Willis and Guzzardi cases, as well as the dissent
in the Harris case would seem to forecast the rationale adopted in the Rochin case, i.e.,
that the Constitution will not countenance conduct by law enforcement officers which
"shocks the conscience." For a discussion of the Willis case, see Bachelder, Use of
Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41 J. CiuM. L., C. & P.S. 189
(1950).
1s 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"5 The federal exclusionary rule was promulgated in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 6914), and has since been adopted in about one-half of the states. As such,
it is limited in its application only to that evidence unlawfully seized by state officers as
is the federal rule limited to actions of federal officers. Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). The federal exclusionary
rule "was not derived from the explicit requirements of the fourth amendment; it was
not based on legislation expressing congressional policy in the enforcement of the
Constitution. The decision was a matter of judicial implication." Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
, Mr. justice Murphy, in dissent, contended that the federal exclusionary rule consti-
tuted the only effective means of insuring to all persons the guarantees of the fourth
amendment and, therefore, the majority was conferring upon the citizens of the states
a virtually meaningless protection from unreasonable searches and seizures by state
officers. 338 U.S. 25, 43-44 (1949). For an analysis of the Wolf case and the unsettled
problems still remaining, see Comment, Due Process and the 4.dmissibility of Evidence,
64 HARV. L. REa. 130 4 (.95.).
"At the time the Wolf case was decided, forty-seven states had passed on the
exclusionary rule question, sixteen states accepting and thirty-one rejecting it. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter appended the majority opinion in Wolf with ten tables of
cases indicating this divergence. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1949).
Since the Wolf decision, however, California, Delaware, North Carolina, Oregon, and
Texas have been added to those states adopting the rule. In addition, it also prevails
in the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii. For the latest compilation see So
A.L.R.2d 531 (2956).
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Rochin v. California,'8 the famous stomach pump case,'17 where it re-
versed a conviction on the ground that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibits that type of conduct which shocks the
conscience by impinging upon certain decencies of civilized behavior.'8
In applying this test to the facts of the case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
described the conduct of the officers as .constituting "methods too dose
to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." 9
Despite the fact that the accused could have instituted an action for bat-
tery against the officers involved, a remedy which apparently prompted
the majority in the Wolf case not to extend the exclusionary rule to the
states,2 0 the Court felt constrained to rule the evidence in question in-
admissible in order to check unconscionable abuses by law enforcement
officers.
A limitation was imposed upon the Rochin test by Irvine v. Cali-
fornia , where the Supreme Court indicated that some degree of violent
16 342 U.S. 165 (x952).
"There, capsules of morphine were forcibly extracted from the suspect's stomach
by means of an emetic following an unlawful entry into the suspect's home by state
police officers.
" The United States Supreme Court has long applied due process limitations to
state criminal proceedings to prevent an unjust result. For example, the Court has
repeatedly reversed convictions obtained by means of coerced confessions, the leading
case being Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also, Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (x94x)i Ward v. Texas, 36 U.S. 547 (1942); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (x944) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,.404 (1945);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (i949)i Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 1S, 19 o
(1952); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
x56 (-953).
16342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
20 "Indeed, the exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to pro-
tect those upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been found. We
cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such
persons, together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of
private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the
eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford. Granting that in practice the exclusion of
evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this
Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process
Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be
equally effective." 338 U.S. 25, 30-31 (-949).
2 "347 U.S. x28 (1954). There law enforcement officers planted a microphone in
the bedroom of a suspected bookmaker through which they were able to obtain a record
of certain incriminating conversations. In disallowing the evidence thus obtained, the
Court rested its decision upon search and seizure principles rather than upon due process.
Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that "[H]owever obnoxious are the facts in the case
before us, they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but rather
a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping." 347 U.S. 128, 133 0954).
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or brutal conduct must be present before that doctrine may be invoked.
This theory was elaborated recently in Breithaapt v. Abram,22 where the
Court held that extracting a blood sample from an unconscious defendant
did not constitute conduct of the character condemned in Rochin, al-
though it was implied that a different result might have been reached
had the defendant been conscious and resisted the attempt by police
to secure the sample.23 The utility of this test was questioned, however,
in a vigorous dissent on the ground that conduct which may shock the
conscience of one man may be deemed reasonable by another.2'
"2 352 U.S. 432 (-957).
2 Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, drew this implication from the following words
of Mr. Justice Clark's majority opinion: "To be sure, the driver here was unconscious
when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious consent, without more, does
not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right .. " 352 U.S.
432, 435 (1957)-
" The majority of the Court pointed out that blood tests are quite common in
modern medicine and are not an unusual occurrence in the life of the average citizen.
Furthermore, they involve bnly slight discomfort and inconvenience, and a regulation of
the State of New Mexico, wherein the Breithaupt case arose, prohibits state police
officers from securing a blood sample unless the process of extraction is performed by a
qualified physician. Even in the cases of municipal law enforcement, it is "the customary
administrative practice" in New Mexico to allow blood to be withdrawn only by a
doctor. The Court was assured by the representative of the state who argued the case
that "in-no instance had a municipality or the state police permitted the test to be made
withoit these precautions." 352 U.S. 432, 438, n. 5 (1957). Finally, the Court
concluded that the slight intrusion necessary to secure the blood was a small price to pay
in relation to the interest of the public in ridding the highways of drunken drivers.
Mr. Justice Clark, for the majority, -stated: "The blood test procedure has become
routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into the military service
as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before
permitting entrance and literally millions of us have voluntarily gone through the
same, though a longer, routine in becoming blood donors. Likewise, we note that a
majority of our States have either enacted statutes in some form authorizing tests of
this nature or permit findings so obtained to be admitted in evidence. We therefore
conclude that a blood test taken by a skilled technician is not such 'conduct that
shocks the conscience,' [Citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (x952)] nor such
a method of obtaining evidence that it offends a 'sense of justice.'"1 [Citing Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-6 (,936).] 352 U.S. 432, 436-437 (x957).
The Chief Justice, on the other hand, pointing out the similarities between the fact
situations in Rochin and Breithaupt, first took issue with the majority for making
physical resistance a "prerequisite to the existence of his (defendant's) constitutional
rights," 352 U.S. 432, 441 (1957), and then stated that the only distinction between
the cases was purely a matter of personal reaction; to found legal principles upon any
such distinction "is to build on shifting sands." 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957). Justices
Black and Douglas joined in the dissent of the Chief Justice.
EVol. 7: 25
1957] FORCIBLE EXTRACTION OF BODY FLUIDS 31
DECISIONS IN THE STATE COURTs
The same objections to the admissibility of evidence based on the
forcible extraction of body fluids have been raised in state courts 25
Most frequently invoked has been the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.26 Typically, however, in State v. Cram it was held that evidence
of intoxication obtained by taking a blood sample from an unconscious
defendant did not violate this guarantee, since the evidence was ob-
tained without the use of any process against him as a witness.28  And,
evidence which is obtainable from a suspect without the possibility
of a perjured confession through threatened or actual bodily injury, it
is argued, is not logically subsumed within this privilege.
Several jurisdictions have, however, held inadmissible evidence based
on physical data supplied by the defendant.29  But even here distinction
" For a collection of cases see Annot. 16€ A.L.R. 967 (1946), supplemented by
Annot. 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (x95.).
25 All state constitutions except those of New Jersey and Iowa contain self-incrimina-
tion clauses. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3rd ed. 1940). See generally: Inbau,
Should We Abolish the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 45 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 1So (1954) Moreland, Historical Background and Implication of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 44. Ky. LJ. 267 (1956)- Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. x (1949). See as well, Corwin,, The
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. REV. z
(1930).
176 Ore. 577, 16o P.2d 283 (945).
". . . the object of the protection seems plain. It is the employment of legal
process to exract from the person's ovn lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus
take the place of other evidence. Such was the process of the ecclesiastical Court, as
opposed through two centuries-the inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon
his oath, in order to supply the lack of the required two witnesses. Such was the com-
plaint of Lilburn and his fellow-objectors, that he ought to be convicted by other
evidence and not by his own forced confession upon oath....
"In other words, it is not any and every compulsion that is the kernel of theprivilege in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.
The one idea is as essential as the other.
"The general principle, therefore, in regard to the form of the protected disclosure,
may be said to be this: The privilege protects a person from any disclosure sought by
legal processes against him as a witness." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE'§ 2263 (3rd ed.
1940).
("Whenever the evidence is confined . . . to qualities of his (defendant's) body
,.substances beyond his power of control, its admissibility is clearly justified by the
more liberal interpretation of the Constitutional provision. Where, however, he is
compelled to do acts which he can use as a means of conveying ideas, the reception of
evidence of his conduct raises serious questions as to the extent to which practical con-
siderations affecting efficient enforcement of the law under modern conditions may be
safely permitted 'to limit the right of privacy and personal liberty."' Morgan, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1949).
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has been drawn between evidence whose collation requires active partici-
pation on the part of the accused and that which requires his mere passive
acquiescence, 30 the latter universally being held admissible, since the
defendant is not forced actively to produce the evidence which may
convict him.' Thus, in Apodaca v. State,32 the court held that since
the appellant was required to touch ' his finger to his nose, to walk
rapidly and slowly, and to turn around abruptly, evidence thereof should
not have been admitted at his trial, since "demonstration by an act
'which tends to self-incrimination is as obnoxious to the immunity
guaranteed by the Constitution as one by words.' ,13
Still another pattern may be discerned: the tendency to hold inad-
missible all evidence secured by compulsion 4 regardless of activity or
passivity on the part of the accused. Exemplary is State v. Height,85
which held inadmissible the results of a physical examination, made at
the instance of the prosecuting attorney over the objection of the de-
" For example, an accused may be required to stand up in court or place himself in
full view of witnesses and the jury. [Citing, inter alia, People v. Gardner, 144 N.Y.
119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894); People v. Clark, i8 Cal.zd 449, 1x6 P.2d 56 (941);
also State v. Clark, z56 Wash. 543, 287 Pac. iS (930) ; State v. Vincent, 222 N.C.
543, 23 S.E.zd 832 (1943).]
Similarly, exhibition of tattoos, scars, marks and wounds has been held admissible.
[Citing, State v. Al Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879); State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85 (1874);
State v. Coleman, 96 W.Va. 544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924).]
Likewise, comparison of footprints, removal of disguises and comparison of finger-
prints and photographs have been held almost unanimously admissible. INI3AU, SELF-
INCRIMINATION, passit (195o).
"
1 This distinction is graphically illustrated by the Texas cases of Apodaca v. State,
14o Tex. Cr. R. 597, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940) and Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Cr. R. 420,
141 S.W.2d 341 (1940), although it does not appear that the privilege was raised in
the latter case. See also, State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924) ; State v.
Barela, 23 N.M. 395, x68 Pac. 545 (1917). See Note, 44 Ky. L.J. 353, 357 (1956),
citing Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.ad 820 (1944) ; Green Lake County v. Domes,
247 Wis. 90, x8 N.W.zd 348 (1945).
:2 146 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1940).
' 146 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1940).
"This interpretation would prohibit any evidence obtained by force from an
accused, regardless of the degree of force used to compel its collation. Proscribed under
this doctrine would be such evidence as fingerprints, photographs, urinalyses, physical
examinations and "line ups." Wigmore criticizes this approach, pointing out that what
is obtained from the accused is not testimony about his body, but the body itself. The
emphasis is erroneously placed on compulsion rather than testimony. 8 WIcMORE, Evi-
DENCE, § 2265 p. 375 (3rd ed. 1940). Apparently, this view expressed that no evi-
dence obtained by compulsion is admissible, stems from a repugnance at admitting
anything secured from one which may lead to his conviction.
as 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 9 3 5 (902).
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fendant-examinee, to determine the presence or absence of venereal
disease. 8 However, this line of authority is now quite attenuated."
State v. Height38 also illustrates a further objection to the forcible
extraction of body fluids, the claim of unreasonable search and seizure,
which has similarly met with little success, 9 although there are deviant
decisions.40  A judicial failure to distinguish between the act of unlaw-
ful search and seizure and the use of evidence so obtained, however, has
often led to confusion in application of sanctions and remedies flowing
" The court rested its decision squarely upon the due process clause of the Iowa
Constitution, stating that the examination was the result of the invasion of defendant's
constitutional right, impliedly guaranteed under the provision of the constitution as to
due process of law not to criminate himself.
Professor Wigmore criticizes the Height case on the grounds that "the attempt
. .. to read the privilege (self-incrimination) by implication into the clause of 'Due
process of law' is futile and unhistorical1 that clause is already a catch-all, overflowing
with misplaced principles, and no 'ex post facto' interpretation can make room for
it in the present privilege." 8 WIGMOitE, EVIDENCE, § 2252 n. 2 (3rd ed. 194o).
37 See State v. Newcomb, azo Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (i9o9); 4- Ky. L.J. 353 supra
note 31. Apparently, these are the only decisions which adopt this view, and their
validity is somewhat in doubt.
Another objection was raised as well, the claim of doctor-patient privilege, which
was rejected in accord with the prevailing rule. Wigmore states: "The confidence that
is protected is only that which is given to a professional physician during a consultation
with a view to curative treatment; for it is that relation only which the law desires to
facilitate." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2382 p. 817 (3rd ed. 194o). See City and
County of San Francisco v. Superior Court in and for City of San Francisco, 37 Calif.
227, 231 P.2d .6 (i95i).
The courts usually reason that the accused did not summon the physician, Leard v.
State, 235 Pac. 243 (Okla. 1925), or that the examination was not conducted with
the idea of creating a physician-patient relationship, State v. Height, supra note 35, or
that no medical treatment was given or contemplated ; but where the doctor renders treat-
ment to the accused in addition to taking the sample, there may be grounds for excluding
his testimony. However, even when first aid is rendered, it is thought that the privilege
should extend no further than to information necessary to render proper treatment,
which would not include the taking of the blood sample. Ladd and Gibson, Legal-
Medical A4spects of Blood Tests to Determine Intoxication, 29 VA. L. REV. 749 (1943).
" "It has long been established that the admissibility of evidence is not affected
by the illegality of the meant through which the party has been enabled to obtain the
evdence." 8 WIGMOR, EVIDENCE § 7193 p. 5 ( 3 rd ed. i94o). However, a sub-
stantial minority of the states follow the federal exclusionary rule. MCCoRmIcK,
EVIDENCE, § 139 p. 295 (1954). A recent count indicates that this minority numbers
twenty-one. Note, 5 UTAH L. Ray. T16 n. 6 (x956). Nevertheless, Wigmore states
that "a warrantless search-and-seizure after or upon a lawful arrest is not within the
exclusionary rule." 8 WiGMOm, EVIDENCE, § 2184a p. 41 ( 3 rd ed. 1940). See State
v. Weltha, 2z8 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940).
40Illustrative is United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949). See
Note, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41 J. CalM. L., C. &
P.S. (.950).
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from each under the doctrine of Wolf v. Colorado.41 Consequently, an
attack on the forcible extraction of fluids from the body of an accused by
state officers on the ground that it constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure might, at least theoretically, prove successful; as a practical
matter, however, the successful maintenance of this contention would
not necessarily preclude the admission of the evidence thus unlawfully
obtained, unless, perhaps, the particular state had adopted an exclusion-
ary rule of its own as a matter of policy 42
The possibility of waiver of one or more of the privileges must also
be considered. 3 Certainly, a voluntary examination will bar the accused
from later asserting a constitutional privilege with respect thereto.
4
'
Furthermore, some courts have held the submission to be voluntary
where the accused erroneously believed that the law required him to
submit,45 or was ignorant of the reason for the examination, 40 or was
under the mistaken belief that the examination was for treatment, 7 or
simply failed to give active resistance 48 Moreover, other courts have
placed the burden of proving, coercion on the accused,49 and two states
have enacted statutes providing for "implied consent" to a blood test,
whereby the accused waives his constitutional privileges by accepting the
"privilege" of using the state highways.50
To mitigate evidentiary difficulties in establishing intoxication,
twenty-three states have enacted statutes providing for the use of chem-
ical tests to determine the amount of alcohol present in the blood, urine,
or breath of the accused." A few states have judicially accepted the use
&1 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"See note 39 supra.
"State v. Duguid, So. Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937); State v. Cash, 219 N.C.
88, x5 S.E.2d 277 (x9p4). See 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, § 659, p. 561
(2th ed. 1955).
"Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E.zd 59 x (1943).
"State v. Werling, 234 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W.2d 318 (1944).
"State v. Duguid, supra note 43.
"Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A.2d 289 (1948).
"Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 682, 18 So.zd 752 (1944); Logan v. State, 269
P.2d 380 (Okla. 1954). Cf. State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657, 153 S.W. 1051 (1913).
"See generally, WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 43-
50 KAN. SEss. LAws, i95s, c. 61, p. 165; N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW
§ 70(5) and § 71a (1957 Supp.). See generally Mamet, Constitutionality of Com-
pulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Intoxication, 36 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
133 (945)-
" The following states have enacted such statutes: Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
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of chemical tests for intoxication without legislative direction,52 but nine
states expressly require the consent of the accused before such tests can
be used.53  Only one state outlines in detail the procedure for the
taking of the body fluids and the making of the tests.4
CONCLUSION
Constitutional guarantees of individual rights are inherently limited
by the demands of public welfare. But where is the balance to be
struck? Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Breithaupt v. Abram,55
attempted to provide such a standard:
We should, ir my opinion, hold that due process means at least
that law-enforcement officers in their efforts to obtain evidence
from persons suspected of crime must stop short of bruising the
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See Comment, Constitutionality of Clam-
ical Tests for Drunken Drivers, iS ALBANY L. REv. 203 (1954).
"For example, in State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936), decided
sixteen years prior to the enactment of the South Dakota statute, it was held 1..... that
physical examination or the taking of a few drops of blood does not amount ... to an
infringement of any constitutional right, for if it was such infringement, manifestly the
Legislature would be powerless to decree it. It is our position that a statute can neither
add to nor detract from the inherent power of the court in such a matter.... If it is not
an invasion of constitutional rights (and we think it very clearly is not), then it lies
within the ambit of the inherent judicial power of courts of record, and legslative per-
mission or authority is superfluous2. See also People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.zd 252, 260 P.2d
8 (955); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 532 (1952); Touchton v. State,
z54 Fla. 682, IS So.2d 752 (1944); People v. Bobezyk, 343 Il. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d
567 (1951); State v. Haner, 231 Iowa 348, x. N.W.2d 91 (i94.i); State v. Morkrid,
226 Iowa 12i1, 286 N.W. 413 (939); United States v. Nesmith, 1z F. Supp. 758
(D.D.C. 1954); Novak v. District of Columbia, 49 A.2d 88 (Munic. Ct. of App. D.C.
1946); Logan v. State, 269 P.2d 380 (Okla. 1954); McKay v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R.
416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (195o). Cf. State v. Gatton, 6o Ohio App. 192, 2o N.E.2d z65
(1938).
"By statute, the following states require consent: GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1 625 (Curn.
Supp. 1955); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.520 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 22,
§ 1so ('955 Supp.); MINN. STAT. § 169.I2 (Cum. Supp. 1956)s NEB. REV. STAT.§ 39-727.0-727.02 (I953); N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:4-5o.i (Cum. Supp. 1955)i
N.D. REV. CODE § - (953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.630 (1955); VA. CODE ANN.
x9 18-75.1-75.3 (Supp. 1956).
B'VA. CODE ANN. § I8-75.I (Supp. 1956). "The blood sample shall be placed
in a sealed container .... Upon completion of taking the sample, the container must
be resealed in the presence of the accused after calling the fact to his attention. The
container shall be especially equipped with a sealing device . . . labeled and identified
showing the person making the test, the name of the accused, the date and time of
the taking... 1
55 352 U.S. 432, 442 (-95.7).
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body, breaking the skin, puncturing tissue or extracting body
fluids, whether they contemplate doing it by force or by stealth.
However, the interests of society in curbing the increasing highway
death rate, due in no small part to drunken driving," coupled with min-
imal incidental pain and discomfort involved in the extraction of body
fluids, demand some modification of the Chief Justice's suggestion that
inviolability of the human body become an incident of due process where
it is suspected that an accused is under the influence of alcohol or nar-
cotics.57 Thus, evidence obtained as the result of body fluid analyses
should be rendered admissible only where the following criteria co-exist:
(i) an overriding public necessity demanding at least minimal in-
vasion of individual rights;
(2) a taking which entails no more than a nominal degree of pain
or discomfort, or which entails more than a nominal degree of
pain or discomfort lasting not more than a few seconds, and
(3) a taking which entails no more than a negligible possibilty
of infection, disease, or lasting ill effects.
Thus, standards are adduced whereby the courts may, upon the merits
of each case, afford maximum protection to the rights of the indi-
vidual58 consistent with the public weal.
""In 1955, 7% of the fatal accidents involving automobiles in urban areas were
due to drunken driving. This is closely par;lleled by the 8% figure in rural areas.
According to reports from twenty states, drinking on the part of a driver or pedestrian
was reported in twenty-six out of every zoo fatal accidents. The figures on drinking
drivers ranged from seven out of every zoo, to forty-five out of every zoo. Six out of
every zoo drivers involved in fatal accidents were classified as drunken drivers or
"under the influence of alcohol." Applying these figures to the 1955 motor death
toll of 38,300 in all forty-eight states, roughly 2,300 persons lost their lives that year
as a result of drunken driving. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS, 51, 53
(1956).
5 The Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute takes the following
position when the self-incrimination privilege has been raised: "No person had a privi-
lege . . . to refuse. . . . (b) to furnish or to permit the taking of samples of body
fluids or substance for analysis." MODEL ConE OF EVIDENCE rule 205 (1942). This
rule, however, would apparently not preclude any other constitutional objection.
"'This analysis does not comprehend recourse for an injury sustained as the result
of a forcible taking of body fluid samples, the ostensible remedy for which is an action
of battery against the officers involved. While this remedy is of dubious practicality,
curative measures must stem from the pressure of public opinion directly or from
legislation.
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